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III

ISSUES ON APPEAL IN VIEW OF THE STATE'S REPONSE

I.

Whether a person convicted of Grand Theft may as a condition of probation be prohibited
from possessing a firearm.

II.

Whether the defendant may be prohibited from living in a dwelling with his family where
a firearm is kept no matter the circumstances.

III.

Whether the Idaho Department of Corrections may prohibit the defendant from living in
a residence where a firearm is kept by another person in a secured location the
probationer has no access to because the owner of the firearm is not a member of law
enforcement.
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ARGUMENT

I.
The state agreed in its brief that the District Court erred in reviewing the defendant's request
to amend the terms of his probation as an agency action. The state, however, claims that it cannot be
sure whether the District Court applied the wrong standard. From the District Court's written
opinion, there can be no doubt that the District Court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of
review. The District Court was required to consider whether the condition placed on the defendant
was reasonably related to his probation. State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct.App.1993).
Moreover, because the term of probation touched on several of the defendant's constitutional rights,
the District Court needed to ensure that the term it reviewed did not deprive liberty greater than
reasonably necessary. US. v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir.2012). The District Court
clearly did not do this, as it failed to recognize that the determination was its own to make, rather
than a simple review of the decision of the Idaho Department of Corrections.
The state also argues that this Court may consider the issues raised by the defendant as the
standard of review is de novo. The defendant agrees with this in part. The level ofreview for a term
of probation that infringes on a basic fundamental constitutional right is a question for this Court to
review, as is the question of whether the Court could prohibit a probationer in the position of the
defendant from possessing a firearm. Ho\vever, even if this Court finds that the District Court had
the ability to require the defendant not to live with his parents if they kept firearms in the home, it
should still remand to allow the District Court to determine if a modified version of the term of
probation could be crafted so as to meet the Idaho Department of Correction's safety concerns and
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the defendant's right to live with his family. This is particularly true where the Department has
admitted that it can make exceptions for those related to law enforcement.

II.
The state argues in its response that because the defendant is a felon he cannot have firearms.
This argument does not appear to address anything the defendant argued. Instead, the state has
apparently chosen to ignore that the Idaho Legislature has not labeled the defendant as a felon that
should lose his right to a firearm. See, I.C. §§ 18-3316, 18-310. The word "felon" is not a magic
talisman before which the Second Amendment shrivels and fades. The federal Congress recognized
that, in view of the over criminalization rampant in our society, simply stating that everyone who is a
"felon" has lost the right to a firearm is as absurd as it would be unconstitutional. See, 18 U.S.C. §
921 (a)(20). Thus, the state's unwillingness to address the actual issue before this Court, whether a
person placed on probation for the crime of Grand Theft can possess a firearm, leaves this Court with
little by way of argument or authority against the defendant's position. Thus, this Court should find
for the defendant.
The state's approach to the defendant's second argument is similarly perplexing. The state
ignores People v. Bauer, 21 Cal.App.3d 937, 944-45 (Cal.Ct.App.1st Dist.1989) citing People v.

Dominguez, 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 628 (Cal.Ct.App.2nd Dist.1967); People v. Beach, 14 7 Cal.App.3d
612, 620-623 (Cal.Ct.App. 2nd Dist. 1983); In re Scarborough, 76 Cal.App.2d 648, 649-651, 173
P.2d 825 (Cal.Ct.App. 3rd Dist. 1946); People v Blakeman, 170 Cal.App.2d 596, 597-599, 339 P.2d
202 (Cal.Ct.App. 1st Dist. 1959); In re Jvfannino, 14 Cal.App.3d 953, 965 (Cal.Ct.App. 1st Dist
1971) overruled on other grounds by People v. Welch, 851 P.2d 802 (Cal.1993); People v. Watkins,
193 Cal.App.3d 1686 (Cal.Ct.App. 1st Dist. 1987), and simply states, "As a matter of fact, Cheatham
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has not been "banished" from anywhere." State's Brief at 10. Whatever "factual banishment" is, it is
not at issue in this case. Legal banishment, however, is, and as the authorities cited demonstrate, it is
the correct term for what occurred due to the term of probation the defendant seeks to amend.
The state goes on to claim that the protections for the family contained in the Constitution
have nothing to do with conditions of probation as to whether a person may live with their family if
their family has firearms no matter how little access the defendant has to those firearms. On the
contrary, conditions of probation must take heed of the values contained in the Constitution. Wolf

Child, 699 F.3d at 1093. The state's argument, that a court need not take heed of terms of probation
that infringe on constitutional rights, is that which has been flatly rejected by other jurisdictions. See,

e.g., US v. Burns, 775 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir.2014); US v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir.2010).
The state attempts to twist the defendant's argument into one in which he is claiming the absolute
right to live with firearms, rather than what he argued, which was that some reasonable steps could
be taken to ensure that the defendant has no access to the firearms owned by his parents. The
District Court, of course, did not attempt to do so because it deferred to the Idaho Department of
Corrections. Thus, this Court should reverse, with instructions that the District Court consider less
intrusive alternatives to the Department's "if the guns stay the probationer cannot" approach.
Lastly, the state misunderstands an Equal Protection challenge. The state cites to State v.

Hamlin, 156 Idaho 307 (Ct.App. 2014), for the proposition that if something applies to everyone, it
cannot be challenged on equal protection ground. In Hamlin, the Court of .A~ppeals found a mentally
disabled man could not complain about a law that did not permit people to have sexual relations with
the mentally disabled, because it applied to everyone. Id. at 316. Here, the defendant is a probationer
complaining that other probationers related to law enforcement are treated differently. The state
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takes the position that because probation treats probationers related to law enforcement differently,
probationers are not similarly situated to the defendant.

From the state's standpoint,

apparently, no law can ever violate Equal Protection of the laws because if the government is treating
people differently, they are automatically not similarly situated. This circular logic, fortunately, is
not the law.
In Taylor v. San Diego County, 800 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2015), the Ninth Circuit
considered two groups of people being civilly detained. The Court held that:
When conducting an equal protection analysis, we first identify the groups being
compared. "The groups must be comprised of similarly situated persons so that the
factor motivating the alleged discrimination can be identified .... " While the group
members may differ in some respects, they must be similar in the respects pertinent
to the State's policy.

Id. at 1169 (quoting Arizona Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1064 (9th Cir.2014)
(citation omitted in original)). In Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800-01 (1997), the United States
Supreme Court reversed a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that had held that "some
terminally ill people-those who are on life-support systems-are treated differently from those who are
not, in that the former may "hasten death" by ending treatment, but the latter may not "hasten death"
through physician-assisted suicide." The Court disagreed, finding:
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction between assisting suicide and
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, a distinction widely recognized and endorsed
in the medical profession and in our legal traditions, is both important and logical; it
is certainly rational. See [Personnel Administrator ofMassachusetts v.] Feeney, [422
U.S. 256,] 272 [(1979)] ("When the basic classification is rationally based, uneven
effects upon particular groups within a class are ordinarily of no constitutional
concern").
The distinction comports with fundamental legal principles of causation and intent.
First, when a patient refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, he dies from an
underlying fatal disease or pathology; but if a patient ingests lethal medication
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prescribed by a physician, he is killed by that medication. See, e.g., People v.
Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 470-472, 527 N.W.2d 714, 728 (1994), cert. denied, 514
S. 1083, 115 S.Ct. 1795, 131 L.Ed.2d 723 (1995); Afatter ofConroy, 98 N.J. 321,
355,486 A.2d 1209, 1226 (1985) (when feeding tube is removed, death "result[s] ...
from [the patient's] underlying medical condition"); In re Colyer, 99 Wash.2d 114,
123, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983) ("[D]eath which occurs after the removal of life
sustaining systems is from natural causes"); American Medical Association, Council
on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Physician-Assisted Suicide, 10 Issues in Law &
Medicine 91, 93 (1994) ("When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient
dies primarily because of an underlying disease").
Id. at 800-01 [footnotes omitted].
In this case, the policy of the Idaho Department of Corrections treats different two groups,
those probationers related to law enforcement and those who are not. It makes this distinction,
apparently, on the basis of the fact that law enforcement officers need to have guns in the home. In
other words, the Department admits that it does not make any kind of inquiry as to whether there is
any actual danger posed by the probationer in question. Rather, it uses a blanket policy to disarm and
in some cases placed on the street anyone placed under its supervision except when they have
relatives in law enforcement. That this smacks of nepotism is clear, but it is also clear that it is
plainly unconstitutional. Thus, this Court should reverse.

DATED this_/_+_··_ day of December, 2015.

OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI
COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
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